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Introduction 
 
 
Changed Priorities in the Gulf 
Saudi Arabia and the Emirates Rethink Their Relationship with Egypt 
Matthias Sailer 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are likely to scale back noticeably 
on their generous financial gifts to Egypt under its President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. In 
the one year that King Salman has ruled Saudi Arabia, the kingdom has improved rela-
tions with the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization the Egyptian regime portrays as 
the source of all evil. Riyadh’s overriding priority is now to stem Iran’s influence in the 
region, particularly in Yemen and Syria. However, in Syria especially, al-Sisi’s stance 
diverges from Saudi Arabia’s. Moreover, both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are frustrated by 
the lack of progress Egypt has made in improving its financial, economic and security 
situation. In addition, low oil prices have brought about a more restrictive spending 
policy in the Gulf. Consequently, for the first time since the overthrow of President 
Mohammed Morsi, Germany and the EU have an opportunity to push for change in Egypt 
by offering financial support that is made conditional on implementing measures to 
increase political participation and improve governance. 
 
Between 2011 and the death of the Saudi 
King Abdullah in January 2015, Saudi and 
UAE regional policies primarily targeted 
preventing the so-called Arab Spring from 
spilling over onto the Arab Peninsula. For 
the rulers of the two autocratically governed 
Gulf States these rebellions represented an 
existential threat. It became apparent as 
early as 2011 that both countries’ foreign 
policies were being militarized. This mili-
tarization occurred in parallel with the US, 
which for decades had guaranteed Saudi 
security, reducing its military commitment 
in the region. A foreign policy relying on 
military means was first seen in March 
2011, when military and police units of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, primarily from 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, marched into 
Bahrain. Their mission was to support Bah-
rain’s ruling family in violently putting 
down a popular uprising. At the time, Bah-
rain’s leaders accused Iran of inciting the 
country’s mainly Shiite population against 
the ruling Sunni dynasty, though without 
providing any evidence. 
However, both Gulf regimes saw the 
main threat as coming from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. That organization emerged 
victorious from Egypt’s first democratic elec-
tions in 2011/2012; and in Tunisia Ennahda, 
which is close to the Brotherhood, received 
the most votes in the October 2011 elections. 
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The regimes of both Gulf States were con-
cerned that with its ever growing political 
influence, the Brotherhood might under-
mine their systems of government from 
Egypt. In the 1950s and 1960s, many mem-
bers and sympathizers of the Egyptian Mus-
lim Brotherhood had fled to Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE to escape persecution in their 
own country. Originally, these mostly well 
educated immigrants had been well received 
in the Gulf States as a boost to the educa-
tional sector, which was then being ex-
panded. As teachers, however, they were 
also able to spread their own ideology. 
Additionally, they became active in the civil 
society, for instance in the charity sector. 
Following the Muslim Brothers’ increasingly 
political behaviour, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE prohibited their activities in the 1990s. 
In 2011 the concern in the Gulf was that the 
Egyptian Brotherhood might incite those 
parts of the population that had been in-
fluenced by its ideology to rise up against 
the monarchies. How threatened the rulers 
of the UAE felt by this scenario is shown by 
the fact that legal proceedings were insti-
tuted there against more than 100 people 
between April 2011 and November 2014. 
Most of the accused were charged with 
founding a secret organization affiliated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood with the 
aim of toppling the UAE regime. Some of 
the accused were Egyptians. 
Alongside the anxiety about an “export 
of revolutions” promoted by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, there was a concern that 
Egypt under the Brotherhood might seek a 
rapprochement with Iran. In August 2012 
Mohammed Morsi was the first Egyptian 
President to travel to Tehran since the 1979 
Revolution. Further state visits between the 
two countries followed. The Muslim Brother-
hood stressed that this upgrading of Iran 
was not aimed at the Arab Gulf states, but 
the latter remained sceptical. When a high-
ranking official of the Muslim Brotherhood 
stated in June 2013 that the UAE would be-
come “slaves of the Persians”, the Emirates’ 
leaders saw their fears confirmed. And since 
Egypt is the most populous Arab country as 
well as the birthplace of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, it initially had a key role 
in the Saudi and UAE fight against that 
organization. 
Opponent: Qatar 
On the other side were the rulers of Qatar, 
which supported the Muslim Brothers. They 
viewed the organization’s rise as a chance 
to extend their own regional and inter-
national influence further. For decades, the 
country had been cultivating close relation-
ships with the Muslim Brothers and other 
Islamist organizations. It therefore seemed 
likely that Qatar would be among those 
profiting most from regime change in the 
Arab countries in turmoil. However, with 
Morsi’s overthrow in July 2013 and the sub-
sequent repression of the Muslim Brother-
hood by the new military regime, it became 
evident that this strategy would not work. 
From that point on, the Qatari leadership 
was increasingly forced to realize that it 
could not maintain its foreign policy against 
the will of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both 
of which supported the new regime in 
Cairo. 
When Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bah-
rain recalled their ambassadors to Qatar in 
March 2014, the pressure became too great. 
Towards the end of the year, Qatar already 
seemed to be moving closer to its former 
opponents’ position. At that time, for in-
stance, the Qatari leadership let it be known 
to several high-ranking Brotherhood offi-
cials living within its borders that their 
presence was putting great pressure on 
Qatar. They left the country. The emirate 
thus partly met Saudi and UAE demands 
not to give shelter to Egyptian dissidents. 
This was good news for the military regime 
in Cairo. 
The end of the Saudi-Emirati block 
against the Muslim Brotherhood 
Developments, however, took a different 
turn. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia died in 
January 2015, depriving Cairo of one of its 
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most important supporters. The new king, 
Salman bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, changed 
Saudi regional policy by speedily imple-
menting a rapprochement with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. This went hand in hand with 
a rapprochement with Qatar and Turkey as 
well as a slight cooling of relations between 
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 
Since Salman’s accession, there have been 
many reports about high-level meetings 
of the Saudi leadership with top-ranking 
officials of regional Brotherhood affiliates, 
such as Rashid al-Ghannouchi (Tunisia), 
Hammam Saeed (Jordan) and Khaled 
Meshaal, the representative of Palestinian 
Hamas. So far, the highpoint has been 
Riyadh’s ambassador to Doha inviting the 
influential Egyptian legal scholar and TV 
preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi for the occasion 
of the Saudi national day in October 2015. 
Few people symbolize the aversion to Egypt’s 
military regime quite as much as al-Qara-
dawi, who is close to the Muslim Brothers 
and has been living in exile in Qatar for 
decades. 
At the same time, King Salman has been 
seeking closer relations with Qatar and 
Turkey (Ankara’s relationship with Egypt 
is tense as well). Photos of a meeting held 
in February 2015 by Mohammed bin Nayef, 
now the Saudi crown prince, and deputy 
crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, with 
the Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani 
showed the participants in a good mood: 
clearly, relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar had substantially improved. Advisors 
to the Qatari government stressed that the 
improvement had occurred very suddenly 
on Salman’s accession to power and that 
today’s bilateral relations were very good. 
Proof of this rapprochement can also 
be found in the Saudi-Qatari cooperation 
in the civil wars in Yemen and Syria. In 
Yemen, where Saudi Arabia is waging a war 
against the Houthi rebels, cooperation with 
Yemen’s Islah – an umbrella organization 
that includes the local offspring of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood – is important. Qatar took 
on the role of mediator here and accom-
plished a rapprochement between the two 
former enemies. The Yemeni Islah and Saudi 
Arabia had been on hostile terms after 
Riyadh declared the Muslim Brotherhood 
a terrorist organization in March 2014. 
In addition, there has been close coopera-
tion with Qatar and Turkey in Syria since 
spring 2015. The military successes of the 
rebel alliance Jaish al-Fatah, forged by Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, brought Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime close to military defeat in the sum-
mer of that year. This rebel alliance includes 
militias that can be categorized as belong-
ing to the Muslim Brotherhood. The defeat 
of the government troops was ultimately 
prevented by Russia’s military intervention 
in autumn 2015. 
UAE: readjustment rather than 
change of course 
Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE have not 
initiated a clear policy change on the Mus-
lim Brotherhood. However, careful readjust-
ments are perceptible here, too. In Yemen, 
for instance, the UAE demonstrate pragma-
tism. Despite not directly working together 
with the Yemeni Islah against the Houthis, 
they support the Saudi approach, which 
comprises cooperating with the movement. 
Ultimately, therefore, Abu Dhabi’s policy 
indirectly strengthens the Yemeni Islah. 
While the UAE and Saudi Arabia have 
essentially been on good terms since 
Salman’s accession, there is also potential 
for conflict. For the time being, the war in 
Yemen is keeping the two countries close. 
According to high-ranking advisors in Abu 
Dhabi, however, once this factor ceases 
to exist, relations could certainly become 
more difficult, mostly because of the coun-
tries’ different attitudes towards the Mus-
lim Brotherhood. 
By contrast, relations between the UAE 
and Qatar remain cool. At the very core of 
their divergences is Qatar’s friendly stance 
towards the Muslim Brothers. The two 
countries clashed particularly hard over 
the Brotherhood and Morsi’s overthrow 
in Egypt, causing lasting damage to their 
relations. 
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Changed perceptions of threats 
These ongoing adaptations of the Gulf 
States in their relations to the Muslim 
Brotherhood and to each other must be 
seen against a series of regional and inter-
national developments that have changed 
the perceptions of threats in Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE. These altered perceptions 
characterize their relationship with Egypt 
today. 
A weakened Muslim Brotherhood 
There is first of all the regional standing of 
the Muslim Brothers. Two-and-a-half years 
on from the overthrow of President Morsi, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE view the Brother-
hood, which has been violently suppressed 
ever since, as weakened. The two countries 
still consider the organization’s ideology 
a threat to their own ruling systems. How-
ever, the threat is now categorized as long-
term rather than acute. Yet in spite of their 
similar evaluation of the Brotherhood, 
aversion to it remains much greater in Abu 
Dhabi than in Riyadh. Top-ranking advisors 
of the gravely ill UAE president and of the 
Abu Dhabi crown prince continue to stress 
the great danger which they see as ema-
nating from the Brotherhood. Public state-
ments of the UAE Minister of State for For-
eign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, underline 
this aversion. In late November 2015, for 
instance, he blamed the Yemeni Islah 
for the difficulties experienced in recaptur-
ing the Houthi-dominated Taiz province. 
Alongside the already mentioned allega-
tions of putsch plans, there is a further 
possible explanation for the UAE’s harsher 
position on the Muslim Brotherhood: 
Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, the Abu 
Dhabi crown prince and the Emirates’ most 
important decision-maker in foreign affairs. 
Mohammed bin Zayed has had a military 
career, and observers describe his world-
view as heavily focused on security. Added 
to this is the aversion for Islamism in 
general and for the Muslim Brotherhood 
in particular that the crown prince shares 
with some of his advisors. 
A strengthened Iran 
Along with the weakening of the Muslim 
Brotherhood there is, for Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, the threat of Iran, which they per-
ceive to have grown substantially. The fact 
that Riyadh pulled out of the anti-Brother-
hood block should above all be interpreted 
as an attempt to forge a broad alliance 
of Sunni states and transnational actors 
against Shiite Iran, in a less and less favour-
able regional and international environ-
ment. 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both 
come to terms with the Vienna nuclear 
accord on Iran in July 2015. However, 
although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi officially 
welcomed the agreement, they believe that 
Iran’s desire to dominate the region con-
tinues to underpin its policies. Media state-
ments made by high-ranking government 
officials of both countries in the autumn 
of 2015 confirm this. The predominant per-
ception in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is that 
they might come to be at a disadvantage in 
the power struggle with Iran. The improve-
ment in relations between Iran and the US 
reinforces this view. Moreover, the Arab 
Gulf States see the US, their traditional 
security guarantor, as increasingly weak. 
The hostile stance of the Sunni Gulf re-
gimes towards Iran is also based on the fear 
that Tehran might stir up the Shiite popu-
lation segments of the Arab Gulf States 
against their ruling dynasties. Along with 
Bahrain, this applies above all to Saudi 
Arabia, where the percentage of Shiites, 
who are concentrated mainly in the east 
of the country, is 10 to 15 percent. Com-
pounding this is Iran’s great influence in 
Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. 
Yemen as a red line 
The great extent to which Iran is now per-
ceived as a threat by Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE can be seen in Yemen. The two Gulf 
States absolutely want to prevent Iran’s 
influence from spreading onto the Arabian 
Peninsula. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi therefore 
consider Yemen the red line that must not 
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be crossed by Iran. They accuse Tehran of 
supporting the Yemeni Houthi rebels, who 
stormed the capital Sanaa in September 
2014 and drove the government of Presi-
dent Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi from office. 
Comments made by Iranian politicians 
have reinforced perceptions in Abu Dhabi 
and Riyadh that this is a part of Tehran’s 
expansionism. For instance, after Sanaa had 
been captured by the Houthis, a member 
of the Iranian parliament said that Iran 
now governed in four Arab capitals: Beirut, 
Damascus, Baghdad and Sanaa. 
It is the Emirates’ military engagement 
in Yemen that most clearly reveals their 
concerns about Iran. Relative to the UAE’s 
small size, their deployment is extensive 
and very risky domestically. According to 
a UAE general quoted by Reuters, around 
4,000 soldiers from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and Sudan were fighting in Yemen 
in early December 2015. The UAE are in-
volved in combat operations with their air 
force and ground troops. Although there 
are no official numbers for the UAE con-
tingent, local observers estimate that its 
overall contribution of troops is greater 
than Saudi Arabia’s. According to press 
reports, there are also 450 Latin American 
soldiers in the UAE ranks. A UN Security 
Council report assumes that an additional 
400 soldiers from Eritrea are embedded in 
the UAE armed forces. 
Local anecdotes about young Emiratis 
demonstrate how risky the deployment is 
domestically: some of them received their 
combat orders in disbelief and only took 
them seriously when the military police 
came looking for them because they had 
not reported for duty. The many stage-
managed visits of condolence made by 
high-ranking Abu Dhabi and Dubai royals 
to the families of fallen soldiers also show 
clearly that the UAE leadership is aware of 
the domestic risks. Should the mood of the 
people turn against the intervention, then 
their rulers’ legitimacy would suffer greatly. 
It must therefore be assumed that the Emir-
ates’ leaders run this risk only because they 
really do feel threatened. 
The UAE’s complex interests 
There has so far been consensus at Emirati 
government level about the necessity for 
the deployment in Yemen, despite some 
divergent interests. Here, the decisive factor 
is the unity between Abu Dhabi – the richest 
UAE emirate by far – and Dubai, whose state 
companies were kept afloat during the finan-
cial crisis in 2009 by around $10bn from 
Abu Dhabi. Dubai, the commercial centre 
of the UAE, has historic trade relations with 
Iran and would like to maintain or expand 
these ties. By contrast, Abu Dhabi sees Iran 
mainly as a threat and has in the past used 
harsher rhetoric against it than Dubai. And 
yet the two Emirates do fundamentally 
agree about the Iranian threat. Commercial 
interests are simply kept strictly separate 
from fundamental security interests. This 
is shown among other things by the lively 
economic relations between the UAE and 
Iran, which exist despite the fact that, 
since 1971, Iran has occupied three islands 
claimed by the Emirates. 
There are further reasons for the UAE’s 
strong involvement in Yemen, besides feel-
ing threatened by Tehran. According to high-
ranking political advisors in Qatar (which 
is a part of the Saudi-led alliance in Yemen), 
the military engagement of the UAE can 
also be explained as a reaction to Riyadh’s 
changed policy towards the Muslim Brother-
hood: the different attitudes are putting 
a strain on bilateral relations. With their 
large-scale military deployment to Yemen, 
the UAE have been able to strengthen them 
considerably. In other words, the deploy-
ment also improves Abu Dhabi’s bargaining 
position in case of future political disagree-
ments with Riyadh. 
Saudi special interests 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, too, the same 
political advisors give an additional ex-
planation for the intervention in Yemen, 
besides the Iran factor: Mohammed bin 
Salman, the Saudi deputy crown prince, is 
also defence minister. According to them, 
the wish to reinforce his position also played 
SWP Comments 8 
January 2016 
6 
a role – albeit a secondary one – in Saudi 
Arabia’s military intervention because it 
allowed this only 31-year-old son of King 
Salman to demonstrate his resoluteness 
and assertiveness. 
The secondary importance of IS 
Compared to the efforts to contain Iran, 
even the fight against the so-called Islamic 
State (IS) currently has only secondary im-
portance for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
There have been several terrorist attacks in 
Saudi Arabia claimed by IS, most recently 
in October 2015. Nonetheless, months ago 
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi sharply reduced 
their participation in the air strikes against 
IS in Syria and Iraq. This makes it very clear 
that the war in Yemen – and thus ultimately 
the containment of Iran – has greater prior-
ity. It is rather unlikely that the Islamic 
anti-terror coalition announced by Saudi 
Arabia in mid-December 2015 represents a 
revised set of priorities. After all, the deputy 
crown prince has already stated that the 
coalition would not exclusively be aimed at 
IS terrorism. Moreover, several alleged mem-
bers seemed unaware of their own member-
ship of the alliance as it was being an-
nounced, which leaves its seriousness in 
doubt. 
Foreign-policy divergences with 
al-Sisi 
Saudi relations with the Egyptian President 
al-Sisi, whose rule is inextricably linked with 
the fight against the Muslim Brothers, are 
currently at a low because of the changed 
perception of threats in Riyadh. This is also 
reflected in some Egyptian commentators’ 
attacks on Saudi Arabia. For instance, in his 
TV show in November 2015, talk show host 
Ibrahim Eissa attacked the Kingdom’s fun-
damentalist state religion and exclaimed, 
“You are terrorism!” Since then, well-known 
Saudi journalists have been openly and 
sharply criticizing al-Sisi, for example be-
cause of Cairo’s attitude to the conflict in 
Syria. In October, Egyptian foreign minister 
Sameh Shoukry welcomed Russia’s inter-
vention there. This was a divergence from 
the Saudi position, which sees the Russian 
air strikes primarily as assisting the Iran-
supported Assad regime. In contrast with 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt would essentially 
accept a solution to the Syria conflict even 
if it provided a future leadership role for 
Bashar al-Assad. 
The Emirati position on the Syria con-
flict is less clear-cut. On the one hand, like 
Riyadh, Abu Dhabi is concerned about a 
possible expansion of Iran’s influence in 
Syria; on the other, the Emirates fear the 
powerful presence of Islamist groups there 
more than Saudi Arabia does. 
Relations between the Gulf States and 
Egypt concerning the military intervention 
in Yemen are more complex. Egypt is criti-
cal of it. However, its reservations in this 
area are less principled in nature. Rather, 
they seem to express dissatisfaction with 
the minor role that the Gulf States gave 
Egypt to play in this conflict. A greater 
engagement would have given al-Sisi an 
opportunity to free Egypt from the one-
sided and almost total dependence on the 
Gulf States. However, according to high-
ranking advisors close to Abu Dhabi’s 
crown prince, Cairo was not asked for a 
greater military contribution, even though 
it would not hesitate to expand its partici-
pation if requested. This seems to confirm 
that the Gulf States are not interested in 
being dependent on Egypt’s help either 
in Yemen or more generally. 
Frustration with al-Sisi’s domestic 
policy performance 
There is now criticism in both Riyadh and 
Abu Dhabi of al-Sisi’s balance sheet in fi-
nancial and economic policy and domestic 
security. According to advisors close to the 
Qatari Emir, Saudi Arabia is disappointed 
at al-Sisi’s lack of success, and is concerned 
about Egypt’s stability. Saudi press reports, 
too, show that these issues are discussed 
critically by the country’s elite. In Novem-
ber 2015, for instance, prominent Saudi 
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commentators bluntly denounced the still 
desperate economic and financial situation 
in Egypt. 
Indeed, Cairo offers scope for criticism. 
Foreign exchange reserves, for instance, 
were hardly higher at $16.4bn in November 
2015 than just before Morsi’s overthrow 
($14.9bn). Since then, however, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE have together poured an esti-
mated $25bn to $41.5bn into Egypt in the 
form of grants, soft loans, and oil and gas 
products. In Abu Dhabi, too, there is an 
awareness that Egypt’s economy is in a 
bad way. After Morsi’s overthrow, the UAE 
had sent a taskforce to Egypt to implement 
projects that were intended to swiftly create 
jobs and bring tangible improvements to 
people on low incomes. However, the UAE 
are aware that these projects cannot by 
themselves stabilize the country economi-
cally and thus also politically. High-ranking 
advisors in Abu Dhabi assume that the 
Egyptian economy and employment situa-
tion will not fundamentally improve in the 
foreseeable future because of strong popu-
lation growth. Every year, up to 800,000 
young professionals flood the Egyptian job 
market, which is incapable of absorbing 
such large numbers because economic 
growth is too weak. There is dissatisfaction 
in Abu Dhabi over Egypt’s too-slow imple-
mentation of urgent economic reforms. 
Moreover, there is noticeable scepticism 
about the capability of the al-Sisi regime to 
get to grips with Egypt’s terrorism problem. 
Low oil prices, high military 
expenditure 
Between July 2014 and mid-December 
2015, the price of Brent Crude plummeted 
by about 65 percent. This has drastically 
reduced Gulf state revenues. Their initial 
optimism that prices would soon rise again 
has now vanished. In addition, there are 
the costs of the war in Yemen. The con-
vergence of these two factors has already 
led to a more restrictive attitude to spend-
ing in the UAE. Influential businessmen 
who are active in the region confirm this 
tendency for the other Arab Gulf States as 
well. In late December, the Saudi leader-
ship, which is faced with a budget deficit 
for 2015 provisionally estimated at $98bn, 
was already forced to curtail subsidies for 
petrol, electricity and water. 
Conclusion: the Gulf States will cut 
their financial support to Egypt 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
are particularly difficult at the moment. 
Their very different opinions on what role 
the Muslim Brotherhood should play are 
virtually impossible to reconcile. For Saudi 
Arabia, the rapprochement with the Brother-
hood is a part of its own strategy against 
Iran – which Riyadh sees as the greatest 
threat by far. Al-Sisi’s position on the Syria 
conflict also diverges from Riyadh’s, and 
Egypt’s precarious economic and security 
situation has stoked the Saudi leadership’s 
disapproval. At the same time, the low price 
of oil puts limits on Saudi Arabia’s financial 
largesse. For this reason, the Kingdom is 
likely to significantly reduce its financial 
support to Cairo. However, the Saudi leader-
ship will not consider completely stopping 
its support, as such a move would risk en-
dangering Egypt’s stability and jeopardiz-
ing Saudi political influence there. 
The expected decline of Saudi Arabia’s 
generosity was already evident in its new 
support package for Egypt, announced in 
December 2015. It held out the prospect of 
state investments over a period of three to 
five years, but no new grants. The package 
also comprises help to cover Egypt’s oil 
needs over the next five years. However, 
this is not in the form of grants either, 
but loans. 
Relations between Abu Dhabi and Cairo 
are less tense, but likewise increasingly bur-
dened with problems. Their shared aversion 
to the Muslim Brotherhood is a uniting fac-
tor. In the Syria conflict too, both sides are 
closer to each other than is the case with 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But delays in im-
plementing economic reforms in Egypt, 
and Cairo’s hitherto unproductive efforts 
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to solve the country’s terrorism problem, 
are causing growing impatience in the 
Emirates. The tenor in Abu Dhabi is that 
there will be continued material support 
for Egypt, but not nearly to the same extent 
as previously, because of the lastingly low 
price of oil. 
With Saudi and UAE generosity decreas-
ing, Cairo will find it noticeably harder to 
cover its own expenditure. The Egyptian 
leadership will therefore have to look for 
complementary or alternative sources of 
income. 
A new situation for Germany and the EU 
is thus taking shape. Up until now, al-Sisi 
could afford to do without Western support, 
which would have been conditional on 
better governance or greater inclusion of 
the suppressed opposition. The Gulf States 
paid even without such conditions. How-
ever, if their generosity now decreases, this 
will put Germany and the EU in a position 
to influence Egypt’s development using 
conditional aid. This will be an opportunity 
to prevent the country’s political and eco-
nomic situation from getting worse and thus 
stop Egypt from becoming a failed state. 
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